

ACTION

OLL 84-0364

Office of Legislative Liaison
Routing Slip

TO:	ACTION	INFO
1. D/OLL		X
3. DD/OLL		X
3. Admin Officer		
4. Liaison	X	
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STAT

SUSPENSE

~~2 Mar 84~~
Date

Action Officer:

Remarks:

24Feb84

Name/Date

STAT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
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5	DDI		X		
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9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OLL	X			
16	C/PAO				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				ILLEGIB
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	C/ACIS		X		
21	NIO/SP		X		
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SUSPENSE		2 March Date			

Remarks

Please prepare reply for DCI's signature.

STAT



Executive Secretary
23 February 1984

Date

JESSE HELMS
NORTH CAROLINA

Chrono

Executive Registry

84 - 730

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 21, 1984

OLL #
84-0864

The Honorable William Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

At a briefing for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 25, 1984 on Soviet SALT violations, I asked a series of questions. [redacted] sent me a note suggesting that I ask the questions formally. I call your attention to the Congressional Record of February 1, 1984, pages S619 and S620. I request that your agency answer my questions as soon as possible. Thank you for your prompt attention to my concerns.

STAT

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,



JESSE HELMS:scs

Enclosure

100 54 0 1 1984

February 1, 1984

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 619

tion and the construction of dams. None of these would be free. Some would cost significant sums of money.

We would be heartened if the cheapest alternative were the best path to food self-sufficiency throughout Africa. That is not the case. In the Sahel, there is no good alternative to very expensive irrigation if the region is to escape permanent dependence on outside donors. Yet our own resources are limited. We must fight our own battle of the budget, and there are practical restraints on what we can do for Africa.

If expensive methods of development cannot always be ruled out without abandoning whole regions of the continent, then our selection of development strategies should be made not only on the basis of method but on the likelihood that the recipient will translate developmental investment into increased production.

As a matter of principle, the United States does not base the offer of food aid on the political or economic philosophy of the recipient country. But I do not believe that same principle should be applied to developmental assistance. It is possible for a country to adopt an economic policy which would render any amount of developmental assistance next to useless. To offer developmental aid to countries whose economic policies discourage production is to squander our own limited resources.

Unfortunately, some African countries, such as Mozambique, have adopted the Marxist scheme of state farms, tight governmental controls and little if any private production of food. To my knowledge, such a strategy has never worked where it has been tried, and it cannot be made to work by any amount of developmental assistance. There is no reason Mozambique cannot become self-sufficient in food. But it will never be self-sufficient if the responsibility for farming is vested not in farmers but in the state. I believe that the interests of Africa and the interests of a prosperous and stable world are served by developmental assistance. But I believe that such assistance should be conditioned on policies within the recipient country which encourage rather than discourage production.

III. SOME MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS

A. South Africa

The aim of South Africa's "Homelands" policy is to uproot the country's blacks from their own homes and resettle them in segregated territories, some of which have been proclaimed to be independent states. Under this program, half of South Africa's blacks, or 40 percent of its total population, have been stuffed into 13 percent of its territory. With much self-congratulation, the government of South Africa claims that its subsidies have helped compensate for the naturally ensuing food shortages in these homelands. However, the world community has also been called upon to send food aid for South Africa's blacks, and this year the United States has contributed \$225,000 to this end.

While the developed world's effort to assist the abused blacks of South Africa is understandable, and perhaps desirable, I am concerned that it amounts to an international subsidy of an unconscionably racist policy. South Africa is not a poor country, and I doubt that it should receive the support of the United States as it pushes its black population into segregated compounds. Perhaps the practical alternative to our present aid effort is even worse: that innocent people go hungry. However, I believe that our food aid to South Africa should at least be reviewed, and if it is offered it should be joined with the strongest moral condemnation of the homelands program.

B. Refugees

The focus of my trip was food not refugees, yet the two problems are related. I visited one camp in Sudan and three in Somalia, all of which were accommodating the large number of refugees who have fled Ethiopia. The government of Somalia claims that people in its camps are receiving less than their daily nutritional requirements. Our Embassy believes that Somalia's refugee count is inflated. I saw a few infants in two of the Somali camps who were emaciated and clearly at grave risk. However, a physician who was associated with a voluntary organization said that he believed the cause of their appearance was chronic diarrhea or some other illness rather than a lack of food. In any event, acute hunger did not appear to be a problem at the refugee camps I visited. Generally, the refugee children appeared healthy and energetic.

When a refugee camp is established, food is soon made available by international donors. As refugees arrive at a camp, they are often in desperate condition. However, if they survive their journey, they do receive sustenance after their arrival. The concern is whether they will ever graduate from refugee status. As a rule, there is insufficient land to make them self-sustaining. There are few opportunities for employment. Years after their arrival in the camp, they sit by the thousands with nothing meaningful to do, waiting for the next distribution of food. They are hopeless, permanent wards of the international donors.

In Somalia, our Ambassador, Robert Oakley, has urged that every effort be made to resettle refugees on productive farm land and to reduce their dependence on donated food. That is a difficult objective to obtain. Clearly, we should not cut helpless people off from their only means of survival in the name of integrating them into society at large. Yet I do not believe we should be satisfied with the creation of permanent communities of international wards. I do not have an answer to this problem. I merely note it as an appropriate subject for our attention.

IV. A MISSION FOR AMERICA

I am convinced that the people of our country would respond enthusiastically to a clear call to save Africa from starvation. America's reverence for human values, its "can do" spirit, its problem solving ability and its capacity to produce food, all would be involved in an effort to meet the crisis in Africa.

When I returned from my 1979 trip to Thailand and Cambodia I saw the remarkable response of the American people to a pressing need. They wanted to help, and they did help—especially our young people. School children held bake sales and car washes to raise funds for the people of Cambodia. College students asked my assistance to go to the Cambodian border in the hope that they could lend a hand. That same spirit exists today in Peace Corps volunteers living in huts in remote African villages. I think it is a dominant strain in the American soul. Americans believe deeply in their country, and they believe that solving problems such as starvation in Africa is what their country is supposed to stand for.

We in government should provide the clear call to action. We should commit the government to a long-term program of food aid and development assistance for Africa, and beyond that we should encourage active participation by the private sector and by the American people themselves. When our constituents ask, "What can we do?", we should have some concrete answer in mind.

Development of a specific, easily understandable and not overly complex program

to save Africa from starvation—a program with a definite role for our private sector and our people—deserves the immediate attention of the President and the Congress.

SOVIET SALT CHEATING

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, today the Senate will hold a special closed session to examine the meaning and impact of Soviet cheating on arms limitation agreements, based upon the report which the President sent to the Senate on January 23. This is an important development for the future of our arms control efforts. Every one of us is anxious to obtain an agreement which will result in real reductions in the nuclear strategic systems which have been built by both sides. But any agreement to accomplish that end must establish confidence that the agreement will be followed by both parties, and that it will not be circumvented.

There is no use in continuing down a path which will result in the diminishing of our security. The very premise of arms control is that a reduction of nuclear arms will make us more secure, not less. But we cannot be sure of the premise unless the agreements themselves are wise in purpose and honest in intent.

The report of the President casts grave doubt upon the integrity of the Soviets and upon their commitment to arms control. In the future, arms control must go back to basics. Our first priority must be to seek the removal of the violations which the President has identified and those which are still under study. Unless the Soviets will show good faith by removing the present violations, and making good the arms control process, our security will be diminished, not increased, by the negotiating process.

In particular, we should use the arms control process to seek the following:

First, the verified dismantling of the illegal second ABM radar in Siberia, and the verified dismantling of the illegal second new type ICBM SS-X-25;

Second, full disclosure of the illegally encrypted telemetry from the illegal tests;

Third, full disclosure and verified dismantling of the illegal SS-16 Mobile ICBM deployment at Plesetsk;

Fourth, full compensation for the KAL 007 shoot-down, which occurred during preparations for an illegal test of the SS-X-25 missile.

Indeed, we should seek to remove all violations in order to test Soviet good faith. As long as these violations remain, we can have no confidence in the arms control process.

The President said in his report that Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter because "it calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks." We should therefore examine the President's report in detail under the highest classification so that all

Senators will be aware of the implications of this matter.

I am gratified that the session today will include not only top secret deliberations on the floor, but code-level briefings by administration officials upstairs in the Senate National Security Office. However, the American public should be aware of some of the issues which are matters of concern. I have prepared a list of unclassified questions from data already extensively reported in the press concerning further Soviet SALT and other arms control treaty violations, which I would like to present to the Senate at this time:

First, is there any evidence and analysis indicating that the Soviets are deploying 12 to 14 warheads on each of their SS-18 super heavy ICBM, despite the fact that SALT II only provides for 10 on each ICBM? Could such deployment add 1,000 nuclear warheads to the present Soviet SS-18 force?

Second, are there Soviet Pechora-Pushkino-class ABM battle management radars at the following six locations, as reported by the press:

One. Abalakovo/Krasnoyarsk (as reported by the President);

Two. Lyaki;

Three. Pechora;

Four. Sary Shagan;

Five. Michelevka; and

Six. Moscow-Pushkino?

Are the Olenogorsk and Komso-molsk ABM radars also reported in the press similar to the above Pechora-Pushkino class?

Third Think, what is the likelihood that additional new large radars in the Pechora or Pushkino class will be discovered? What are the implications of such a discovery?

Fourth, is the Soviet SA-12 a mobile antiballistic missile? What effect would the production of 1,000 units of the SA-12 have on our own ability to retaliate against the Soviet Union? When will the Soviets reach the level of 1,000 SA-12 units?

Fifth, is the new Soviet SLBM, the SS-NX-23, a heavy SLBM in the terminology of article 9 of SALT II, and therefore prohibited?

Sixth, are the Soviets violating the Montreux Convention by sending aircraft carriers through the Dardanelles?

Seventh, are the Soviets violating the Conventional Weapons Convention of 1980 by their genocide and use of illegal incendiary bombs in Afghanistan?

Eighth, is there an expanding pattern of Soviet strategic camouflage, concealment, and deception under the command of Marshal Nicolai Ogarkov, the Soviet Chief of General Staff? Is it significant that Marshal Ogarkov himself was formerly in charge of both SALT negotiations and of the Directorate of Strategic Deception?

Ninth, are the Soviets producing 32 to 36 Backfire bombers per year, when

Brezhnev personally promised to President Carter as an integral part of the SALT II negotiations that the Soviets would not produce more than 30 per year?

Tenth, have the Soviets exceeded the SALT II ceilings on multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's)?

Do the Soviets have more than the SALT II ceiling of 820 MIRV'd ICBM's, the ceiling of 1,200 MIRV'd ICBM's and SLMB's, and the ceiling of 1,320 MIRV'd missile launchers and bombers equipped with long-range cruise missile, including those under construction?

Eleventh, have the Soviets recently deployed Backfire bombers in Arctic staging bases, in violation of Brezhnev's written SALT II Backfire bomber statement that the Backfire would not be given intercontinental radius flying capabilities?

Mr. President, these are questions which have been raised by the press accounts. They are questions which demand answers. I hope that we will get these answers this afternoon.

In addition, Mr. President, I note that many of these issues are already being discussed in press commentary. I would like to comment in particular editorials which have appeared in the Wall Street Journal of January 25, 1984, and in the Washington Times of January 27, 1984.

The Journal editorial is entitled "How Now on Soviet Cheating." It makes several important points. First, the Journal says that it is extremely dangerous for America and for world peace for the United States to abide by arms control treaties with which the Soviets do not intend to comply. The Journal points out that the Soviets want us to become immobilized by the politics of arms control, and thereby become unable to take compensatory strategic actions to negate the Soviet advantages gained from cheating.

Mr. President, this is a point I myself stressed on this floor on September 30, when I warned about U.S. paralysis in the face of Soviet SALT break out. The Journal editorial suggests that the Soviets may conclude—if we do nothing—that even if they are caught cheating, and accused of cheating, they can get away with it.

Mr. President, the second article is from the Washington Times, entitled "Why Soviets Cheat," by Patrick Buchanan. Mr. Buchanan points out correctly the huge Soviet strategic advantage gained from their cheating on the 1972 SALT I agreements alone: Their illegal deployment of the heavy SS-19 ICBM vastly increasing their counterforce capability, and their construction of an illegal nationwide ABM defense.

Mr. Buchanan points out that the Soviets have spent the equivalent of over \$500 billion to achieve a nuclear war-winning capability. He concludes that there is only one way to negate

the huge Soviet offensive and defensive advantages: "It is for the United States to launch, with Manhattan Project urgency, a program for a land- and space-based defense of its strategic missile force and of its homeland."

Mr. President, I strongly agree with Mr. Buchanan. An effective ABM defense is the only thing that can save America in this hour of danger. Mr. Buchanan lays out the scenario if we fail: "Not too far ahead, probably, lies the greatest confrontation of the Cold War, with Moscow holding the high cards."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the two articles I have been discussing be printed in the RECORD.

Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that two letters sent to the President today by myself and seven distinguished colleagues be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters and articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

(From the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 25, 1984)

HOW NOW ON CHEATING?

President Reagan Monday sent a 50-page secret document to Congress detailing what the administration called "an expanding pattern of Soviet violations or possible violations of arms control agreements." Press coverage was muted, as the administration apparently hoped it would be. The New York Times used quote marks in such a way as to imply doubts about the validity of what it called a "fact sheet" describing the report for public benefit. The principal implication the president himself had drawn was that "better treaty drafting" and more workable verification procedures would be needed in future arms negotiations.

In short, few people in or out of government are ready yet to face the true implication of Soviet cheating: It is extremely dangerous to U.S. and Free World security to negotiate and abide by arms agreements that the Soviets do not intend to keep. The message this American vacillation sends to Moscow's generals and politburo chieftains is that they can cheat at no cost. The Americans, they will believe, have been immobilized by the politics of arms control—the hope and belief that arms control treaties do in fact limit the construction and deployment of arms.

Fewer than 10 of some 41 Soviet violations listed in a recent Heritage Foundation study are mentioned in the president's report. But even the four termed as definite cheating are profound.

Most important is the construction of radar stations outside the area allowed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty of 1972. In combination with other ABM violations not cited, such as radar testing and surface-to-air missile deployments nearby, the radar sites form a Soviet ABM capability that goes far beyond the treaty restrictions limiting such defenses to either a capital city or a missile field. With the Soviets building screens against our bombers and submarines, plus extensive civil defenses, the effectiveness of our deterrent force becomes increasingly suspect. To the extent that the Soviets gain an edge, their threatening propaganda messages to the West become more credible, as we learned last summer when they stimulated a significant unilateral disarmament groundswell in the U.S. and Europe.